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 NEW YORK’S EDUCATION FINANCE 
LITIGATION AND THE TITLE VI WAVE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL 
EQUITY V. STATE* 
Sarah S. Erving** 
Above all things, I hope the education of the common 
people will be attended to; convinced that on their good 
sense we may rely with most security for the preservation 
of a due degree of liberty.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly fifty years have passed since the Supreme Court 
decided in Brown v. Board of Education2 that state action 
maintaining racially segregated schools violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.3 Since 
Brown, public education policy has remained a critical issue in 
our nation’s jurisprudence. In holding that separate is inherently 
unequal, the Court established that equality in education is the 
                                                          
 * 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995) (“CFE I”), remanded to 719 N.Y.S.2d 
475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001). 
 ** Brooklyn Law School Class of 2002; M.A., St. John’s College, 1999; 
B.A., University of California, Santa Cruz, 1995. The author wishes to thank 
her Dad and Felipe for their extraordinary support in everything she pursues. 
The author also wishes to thank her students at I.S. 164 who were the 
inspiration for this note. 
1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (1787), available at 
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations (last visited Jan. 15, 2002). 
2 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that state 
mandated segregation in schools violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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ideal our schools should achieve.4 
Today, equality remains a core issue for education advocates, 
but the battleground has shifted from racial segregation to 
inequality in educational resources.5 With this change in focus, 
the tools advocates use to obtain equality in schools have also 
changed dramatically since Brown. Instead of relying on federal 
and state equal protection clauses to litigate equality issues, 
education advocates make claims based on education provisions 
in state constitutions and, most recently, on regulations of Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VI regulations”).6 Advocates 
no longer rely on equal protection claims because the remedy 
associated with those claims, forcing states to distribute money 
equally among school districts, has had disastrous results.7 
Instead of seeing an increase in funds to underfunded schools, 
this remedy has inevitably caused states to reduce their per pupil 
spending and student achievement.8 
Despite our nation’s long history of deeming equality a vital 
                                                          
4 Brown, 347 U.S. at 483. 
5 See infra Part I (discussing the shift in education finance litigation from 
equality to adequacy issues). 
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2000). Since the 
Supreme Court held in Alexander v. Sandoval, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001), that 
there exists no private right of action under Title VI regulations, two district 
courts have held that Title VI regulations can be privately enforced through § 
1983. See Lucero v. Detroit Pub. Sch., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, available at 
2001 WL 1013368 (E.D. Mich. 2001); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001). See also 
Alexander, 531 U.S. at 1523 (Stevens J., dissenting). For the purposes of this 
note, I assume that Title VI regulations may be enforced privately through § 
1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
7 See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); see also Molly S. 
McUsic, The Law’s Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and 
Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX 
STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 88, 114 (Jay P. Heubert 
ed., 1999). “[T]he aftermath of equalization efforts inspired by school finance 
litigation . . . show that on average, states that adopt plans that reduce local 
funding inequalities tend to see lower than average growth over time in 
educational spending.” Id. 
8 See infra Part I.A.1 (discussing the problems associated with equal 
protection claims). 
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element of our democratic society,9 especially in education,10 
courts are not willing to provide equality at the price of 
mediocrity.11 Recognizing that strict notions of equality may 
result in second-rate education for all, courts now determine if 
the education financing system provides a minimum level of 
education set by the education article of the applicable state 
constitution.12 As a result, advocates seeking to reform public 
school financing bring claims based on the failure of the state to 
provide children with an adequate education.13 However, this 
movement is waning due to the reluctance of courts to implement 
the detailed and comprehensive remedies associated with 
adequacy litigation.14 Holdings in New York public school 
                                                          
  9 See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 
1776) (stating that “[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal”); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 1 (2000) (“No government is legitimate that does not 
show equal concern for the fate of all those citizens over whom it claims 
dominion and from whom it claims allegiance.”); JOHN P. MCKAY ET AL., A 
HISTORY OF WESTERN SOCIETY 669 (3d ed. 1987) (claiming that “[t]he ideas 
of liberty and equality—the central ideas of classical liberalism—have deep 
roots in Western history”); Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech 
delivered on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington D.C. (Aug. 28, 
1963), available at http://web66.coled.umn.edu/new/MLK/MLK.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2000) (“I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up 
and live out the true meaning of its creed. We hold these truths to be 
self-evident that all men are created equal.”). 
  10 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (holding that “[s]eparate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal”). 
  11 See Jon Mills & Timothy Mclendon, Setting a New Standard for Public 
Education: Revision 6 Increases the Duty of the State to Make “Adequate 
Provision” for Florida Schools, 52 FLA. L. REV. 329, 356 (2000) (stating that 
“[a] finding of constitutional uniformity does not necessarily mean that the 
system is good because, in fact, a uniformly poor system would be 
constitutional”). 
  12 Id. at 340 (stating that “[t]he idea of focusing on adequacy as requiring 
some basic level of educational quality was also attractive to those who 
realized that equity arguments often failed in court or in the public forum by 
pitting poorer districts against richer districts, raising poor schools only by 
handicapping those schools that are succeeding”). 
13 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). 
14 See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995). 
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financing cases tend to show that New York State is also 
reluctant to provide remedies in equity and adequacy cases. The 
New York Court of Appeals has thrice rejected plaintiffs’ federal 
and state equal protection claims and twice rejected their 
adequacy claims.15 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State,16 (“CFE I”) is the most 
recent challenge to New York State’s public school financing 
system. Upon defendants’ motion, the New York Court of 
Appeals dismissed plaintiffs’ state and federal equal protection 
claims.17 In addition, the court held that the plaintiffs successfully 
alleged a cause of action under the Education Article of the New 
York Constitution and under the Title VI regulations.18 Six years 
later in 2001, plaintiffs won on those claims at the trial level,19 
and the defendants quickly appealed.20 Plaintiffs’ success on 
appeal will be determined to a large extent by the willingness of 
the New York Court of Appeals to issue an enforceable remedy. 
Equity claims have proven unworkable because their remedy 
requires equal distribution of funding.21 Although the remedies 
for adequacy claims do not require such distribution, they too 
have proven unworkable as implementation requires a large 
amount of judicial intervention.22 Because enforcement of Title 
                                                          
15 See Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); REFIT v. 
Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1995); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 
655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995) (“CFE I”). 
  16 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995), remanded to 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2001). 
  17 Id. at 663. 
  18 Id. See also supra note 4. 
  19 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2001) (“2001 CFE”). 
  20 Richard Pérez-Peña with Abby Goodnough, Pataki to Appeal Decision 
by Judge on Aid to Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001, at A1. 
21 See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
22 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 384 (N.J. 1990). The 
Abbott decision provided poor urban school districts in New Jersey with a 
comprehensive plan to improve the state’s urban schools. Since then, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court has made many additional rulings in an attempt to 
implement the 1990 decision. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 
1993); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997); Abbott v. Burke, 710 
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VI remedies avoids the pitfalls of equity and adequacy claims, 
Title VI regulations claims could be the new wave of education 
finance litigation. 
The courtrooms in nearly every state of the country have 
entertained litigation attempting to overturn education financing 
systems with varying degrees of success.23 Plaintiffs in these 
cases are generally concerned community members, including 
parents, teachers, and school boards.24 Defendants tend to be the 
state education departments, city boards of education, or officials 
acting under the color of law.25 Plaintiffs have won in nineteen 
states, successfully overturning their states’ education financing 
systems.26 However, plaintiffs have also lost claims in sixteen 
                                                          
A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke, 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000); Abbott 
v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82 (N.J. 2000). 
23 See infra note 26-28 (listing cases). 
  24 For example, Campaign for Fiscal Equity is a New York State 
not-for-profit corporation consisting of community school boards, students, 
parents, and advocacy organizations. See CFE I, 655 N.E.2d at 663. 
  25 For example, in CFE I, defendants are the State of New York and state 
officials responsible for implementing New York’s funding scheme. 655 
N.E.2d at 661. 
  26 See Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 
1993); Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141 (Ariz. 1997); Roosevelt Elementary 
Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Shofstall v. Hollins, 
515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25, 917 
S.W.2d 530 (Ark. 1996); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 
(Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Serrano v. Priest, 
487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Sheff v. O’Neil, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); 
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better 
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec’y. of the Exec. 
Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Milliken v. Green, 212 
N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 
1972); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 
1990); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); 
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 
273 (N.J. 1973); Bismarck Public Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 
1994); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); Abbeville County 
Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 
1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. 
Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1984); State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 
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other states,27 and in two states, courts have refused to adjudicate 
the matter, holding that to do so would usurp the role of the 
legislature.28 
This note focuses on New York’s struggle for fair funding in 
its public school system in Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State 
(“2001 CFE”)29 and argues that its Title VI holding should 
motivate state legislatures to provide appropriate funding without 
the need for extensive judicial intervention. Part I provides a 
background of the national trends in school finance litigation, and 
discusses 2001 CFE’s place among those trends. Part II 
demonstrates that finance claims will only succeed if courts issue 
enforceable remedies and that past school finance litigation 
strategies have failed due to courts’ refusals to intrude upon the 
                                                          
19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 
1238 (Wyo. 1995); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 
310 (Wyo. 1980). 
  27 See Matanuska-Sustina Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391 
(Alaska 1997); Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 
1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Idaho Sch. for 
Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 976 P.2d 913 (Idaho 1998); Thompson v. 
Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 
885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994); Charlet v. State, 713 So. 2d 1199 (La. Ct. App. 
1998); Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm’r, 659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995); 
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Skeen 
v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 
(Neb. 1993); Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d 647 
(N.Y. 1995); Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Leandro v. 
State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. 
State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1997); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding v. 
State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); 
Withers v. State, 891 P.2d 675 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); City of Pawtucket v. 
Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 
(Va. 1994); Scott v. Commonwealth, No. HC-77-1, 1992 WL 885029 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. Nov. 20, 1992); Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000); 
Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989). 
  28 See Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 
680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. 
1999); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); 
Marrero v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998). 
  29 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001). 
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province of state legislatures.30 Finally, Part III argues that 
claims based on Title VI regulations will be successful because 
Title VI, enacted pursuant to congressional spending power, 
allows courts to enforce remedies by issuing injunctions “against 
the payment of federal monies” to the state, “should the state not 
develop a conforming plan within a reasonable period of time.”31 
Part III further demonstrates that courts will consistently rule in 
favor of plaintiffs who can show the state’s funding scheme 
violates Title VI regulations because the enforcement mechanism 
will prevent courts from interfering with a state legislature, “who 
is better positioned to gauge the effects of reform on the state as 
a whole.”32 This note concludes that advocates for education 
finance reform should include Title VI claims in their pleadings 
as they are most likely to lead to consistent plaintiff victories in 
state and federal court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Educators have hailed 2001 CFE as “the most important 
judicial decision since Brown.”33 Its strength reflects the 
plaintiffs’ careful analysis of both national and New York finance 
litigation, distilling thirty years of triumph and mistake into a 
succinct rule of law: a funding system violates federal and state 
law when it fails “to provide the opportunity for a sound basic 
education.”34 The maxim did not reveal itself easily as “[c]ases 
do not unfold their principles for the asking. They yield up their 
                                                          
  30 See Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 59 (commenting that New Jersey’s battle to 
enforce its decision in Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990), “provide[s] 
a chilling example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the 
duties of a Legislature”); see also Comm. for Educ. Rights, 672 N.E.2d 1178; 
Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186; Marrero, 709 A.2d at 956. 
  31 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970); see also Guardians 
Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Pennhurst v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
  32 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 549. 
  33 Randi Weingarten, Getting Our Fair Share: Fair Funding For Public 
Education, Address at Manhattan’s Public School 9 (Feb. 15, 2001). 
  34 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 549. 
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kernel slowly and painfully.”35 The following is a history of how 
the 2001 CFE’s rule of law came to be. 
A. A Synopsis of Education Litigation 
1. Waves 
Since the Supreme Court declared in San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez36 that education is not a fundamental right, advocates 
have pursued state constitutional claims as the avenue for 
change.37 Rodriguez shut the door to education challenges in 
federal courts but opened many doors in the state court systems, 
resulting in a large amount of state education litigation.38 In an 
attempt to understand the enormous amount of litigation, scholars 
have placed the finance cases into categories based on the 
plaintiffs’ litigation strategies.39 
Scholars refer to the several litigation strategies employed by 
advocates as “waves.”40 Plaintiffs using the first wave strategy 
argue that the state’s funding system violates the Federal Equal 
Protection Clause.41 Prior to 1973, this federal claim was 
                                                          
  35 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 29 
(1921). 
  36 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that education is not a fundamental right). 
37 See generally Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance 
Litigation, and The “Third Wave”: From Equity To Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1151 (1995). 
  38 See supra notes 26-28 (citing over forty cases). 
  39 See, e.g., Erica B. Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right 
to a Bilingual Education, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 87-92 (1974); 
Mills & Mclendon, supra note 11, at 335-42. In addition, scholars place states 
into one of four categories depending on the strength of the language of the 
education provision in the state’s constitution. Mills & Mclendon, supra note 
11, at 342-47. 
  40 See Grubb, supra note 30, at 87-92; Mills & Mclendon, supra note 11, 
at 335-42. 
  41 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating that “[n]o state shall deny . . . to 
any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws”). 
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successful in several state courts.42 Rodriguez, however, marked 
the end of the first wave of education litigation.43 In Rodriguez, 
the Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right, 
and thus, state education financing systems need only be 
“rationally related” to an important state interest.44 Some courts, 
however, have ruled favorably on the federal claim, maintaining 
that state financing schemes do not even pass the standard of 
rational basis review.45 
The second wave, also known as the “equity” wave, is an 
attempt to answer Rodriguez’s bar to federal education 
litigation.46 Advocates argue in state courts that the funding 
systems violate states’ equal protection and education provisions 
of their respective constitutions.47 Most scholars agree that, 
although more fruitful than the first wave, the second wave 
creates confusion for advocates due to courts handing down 
inconsistent rulings.48 Scholars also agree that the courts usually 
disregard equity claims because second wave remedies merely 
level out funding, that is, they take funding from the wealthy and 
                                                          
  42 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d. 1241 (Cal. 1971) (holding that 
the state’s system of funding was inequitable in violation of the Federal Equal 
Protection Clause). 
43 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 (holding that education is not a 
fundamental right under the Federal Constitution and therefore financing 
schemes would be reviewed only for rationality). 
  44 Id. 
  45 See, e.g., Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25, 917 S.W.2d 530 
(Ark. 1996). 
  46 See Mills & Mclendon, supra note 11, at 336-37. 
  47 See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) (holding that 
the state’s education system was inadequate under the state’s Equal Protection 
Clause); Bismark Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994) 
(holding that the state’s funding system was inequitable under the state’s Equal 
Protection provision). 
  48 See, e.g., Mills & Mclendon, supra note 11, at 337 (citing Frank J. 
Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz, Disorder in the Courts: The Aftermath of San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez in the State Courts, 30 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 551 (1996)) (stating that “[t]he result of the second equity wave was a 
patchwork of inconsistent state court decisions, continuing legal uncertainty as 
to the sufficiency of many education finance systems”). 
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give it to the poor.49 
For example, in Serrano v. Priest,50 the California Supreme 
Court ordered that the state spend an equal amount of money 
financing rich and poor school districts. The court order resulted 
in Proposition 13,51 which placed strict limits on property taxes, 
pushing California’s average spending per student downward 
relative to the rest of the country.52 As a consequence, California 
placed forty-second in the nation in per pupil spending, down 
from fifth.53 Some scholars suggest that equalizing spending does 
not guarantee “that all school districts within a state spend 
enough money per pupil to provide all with an adequate 
education.”54 In November 2000, attempting to combat its 
declining quality of education, California put to the voters 
Proposition 38,55 which would have given every student a $4,000 
                                                          
49 See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School 
Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 155 (1995). Criticizing the equity 
wave, Enrich states: “While the demand for equal treatment by government 
has a powerful initial allure, the concrete application of that demand to 
education has proven deeply threatening to other powerful societal values.” Id. 
at 155. See also McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 164 (Ga. 1981) 
(showing vehement opposition to equalizing funding, the court states that 
“[n]owhere in [Georgia’s] Constitution is there any obligation of the state to 
equalize educational opportunities”); Michael Rebell, Campaign for Fiscal 
Equity, Blueprint for Better Schools: Definition of a Sound Basic Education, 
Statewide Fair Funding Principles for Effective Accountability (Fall 1998) 
[hereinafter Blueprint] (on file with the Journal of Law and Policy) (stating 
that “[t]he state should increase aid to poor districts but should not impose 
ceilings on expenditures of any other districts”). 
  50 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976). 
  51 CAL. CONST. art. 13A, § 4. 
  52 See generally Seebach, Equal School Funding Doesn’t Pass the Test, 
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 30, 1994, at B10. 
  53 Editorial, The Fight for a Sound Education, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 
2000, at A24. But see CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, YEARBOOK 2000: THE 
STATE OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 148 (2000) (ranking California thirty-fifth in 
the 1995-96 school year with a per student expenditure of $4,973). 
  54 Andrew Reschovsky, Fiscal Equalization and School Finance, NAT’L 
TAX J., Mar. 1, 1994. 
  55 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 38. 
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voucher, enabling each child to attend a private school.56 
Proposition 38 did not pass, but the state’s reaction to equal fund 
distribution became a lesson for advocates in education finance 
reform.57 Advocates realize that a successful claim must not take 
away funding from the wealthier districts; it must only increase 
funding in the poorer districts.58 
Courts view the aftermath of Serrano as a disaster that should 
be avoided at all costs.59 For this reason, many courts dismiss 
both state and federal equal protection claims altogether.60 
Courts’ fears of Serrano’s “Robin Hood” solution has made 
equal fund distribution an increasingly unattractive remedy and 
hence an unsuccessful claim.61 
In response to the failure of state and federal equal protection 
claims, many advocates instead claim violations of state 
constitutions that require or are interpreted to require a minimum 
level of education quality.62 This “adequacy” argument is known 
                                                          
  56 Id. at § 4(d)(1). See generally Ted Halstead & Michael Lind, The 
National Debate over School Funding Needs a Federal Focus, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 8, 2000. 
57 See, e.g., McUsic, supra note 7. 
  58 Blueprint, supra note 49 and accompanying text (suggesting that New 
York adopt a school financing plan that provides adequate funding for poor 
districts without taking money from wealthier districts). 
  59 See, e.g., Seebach, supra note 52, at B10 (“[California’s] slide into 
educational decrepitude began with . . . Serrano.”); see also McUsic, supra 
note 7, at 112 (stating that “California is now becoming the best argument 
against it own school financing approach. . . . Only seventeen states spend less 
per pupil on public education, and Mississippi is the only state with lower 
average reading proficiency scores.”). 
  60 See, e.g., CFE I, 655 N.E.2d at 663. 
  61 See Robert W. Wassmer, School Finance Reform: An Empirical Test of 
the Economics of Public Opinion, 25 PUB. FIN. Q. 393 (1997), available at 
1997 WL 13741398. 
  62 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 
1989) (citing KY. CONST. § 183) (holding that the education system was 
inadequate under the state education provision that states “[t]he General 
Assembly shall . . . provide for an efficient system of common schools”); 
Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994) 
(citing ARIZ. CONST. art. XI § 1) (invalidating an education funding system as 
inequitable under the education provision of the state constitution providing 
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as the third wave in finance litigation.63 Third wave litigation 
avoids the “Robin Hood” effect by focusing on the adequacy of a 
district’s financing scheme.64 In so doing, the adequacy wave 
necessarily focuses, to some extent, on the language of education 
provisions in state constitutions. For example, in Seattle School 
District Number 1 v. State,65 the Supreme Court of Washington 
held that the education system was inadequate under the state’s 
education provision.66 The court held that the legislature failed to 
meet its “paramount duty” to fully fund the school system as 
required by the Washington State Constitution.67 
The second and third waves proved increasingly more 
successful as state courts used the claims to overturn nineteen 
state education systems rendering them unconstitutional.68 
Although preferable to equity claims, adequacy claims present 
their own problems. Some courts admonish those states where 
the judiciary acts as a “self- appointed overseer of education.”69 
In City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun,70 the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island criticized New Jersey’s long court battle to enforce the 
remedy declared in Abbott v. Burke,71 stating that “[t]he volume 
of litigation and the extent of judicial oversight provide a chilling 
example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the 
duty of the legislature.”72 Fear of judicial activism and judicial 
                                                          
that “[t]he Legislature shall . . . provide for the establishment and 
maintenance of a general and uniform public school system”). 
63 See Heise, supra note 37. 
64 See Heise, supra note 37. 
65 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). 
  66 WASH CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“It is the paramount duty of the state to 
make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its 
borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or 
sex.”). 
  67 Id. 
  68 See supra note 26 (citing those cases overturning the state’s education 
funding scheme). 
  69 City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995). 
  70 Id. 
71 Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). 
72 Id. (stating that the New Jersey Supreme Court took on the role of the 
legislature and violated separation of powers in the process). But see Kevin M. 
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encroachment on the legislative branch has caused some courts to 
relinquish their duty to interpret the constitution altogether.73 
Four decisions in three states illustrate judicial refusal to 
adjudicate first, second, and third wave claims on the grounds 
that to do so would violate the doctrine of separation of powers.74 
                                                          
Mulcahy, Note, Modeling the Garden: How New Jersey Built the Most 
Progressive State Supreme Court and What California Can Learn, 40 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 863, 876 (2000) (“Beyond providing the opportunity for 
school-finance reform, the Robinson series of decisions reflect perhaps the 
best example of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s activism.”). 
  73 See MICHAEL A. REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY 
MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 201 
(1982). The authors state: 
When courts are properly operating within the sphere of principle as 
defined by the Supreme Court, the institution of American 
government that has been acknowledged (at least since Marbury v. 
Madison) to have the responsibility for determining ultimate 
constitutional principles, they cannot be said to be violating 
separation-of-powers limitations or to have usurped policy roles of 
other branches. 
Id. at 201-02. 
  74 See Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 
680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996) (refraining from adjudication on grounds of 
separation of powers); Lewis v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. 1999) 
(holding that students have no cause of action under the state constitution in 
alleging that the state has not provided an adequate education); Comm’n. for 
Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 641 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. 1996) (refraining from 
adjudication on grounds of separation of powers); Marrero v. Commonwealth, 
709 A.2d 956, 963-64 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (noting that “all matters, 
whether they be contracts bearing upon education, or legislative 
determinations of school policy or the scope of educational activity, everything 
directly related to the maintenance of a ‘thorough and efficient system of 
public schools’ must at all times be subject to future legislative control”). It 
should be noted that at the time Coalition for Adequacy was decided, Florida 
had weak language in its state constitution. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (1868) 
(stating that “the legislature shall provide for a uniform system of public free 
schools”). It has since amended its constitution to include stronger language. 
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (1998) (stating that it is the “paramount duty of the 
state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing 
within its border”). It is unclear whether new finance litigation would result in 
a plaintiff victory given the stronger language. See generally Mills & 
Mclendon, supra note 11, at 380-81. The new provision reads: 
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Because courts want to avoid the remedies associated with 
second and third wave litigation, the law in this area is 
inconsistent.75 For this reason, advocates have taken the 
opportunity to litigate claims based on Title VI regulations.76 
These advocates claim that state funding schemes disparately 
impact minority children.77 Because Title VI school finance 
litigation is in its embryonic stage, scholars have not yet named 
this fourth wave of litigation. This comment argues, however, 
that claims based on Title VI through § 1983 constitute the new 
and hopefully, final wave of litigation. 
2. History of Education Litigation in New York 
New York’s first Constitution of 177778 made no reference to 
                                                          
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the 
State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to 
make adequate provision for the education of all children residing 
within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a 
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public 
schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and for 
the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher 
learning and other public education programs that the needs of the 
people may require. 
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. Because statistics show that strong language does 
not always result in success for the plaintiff, amending New York’s 
Constitution to include stronger language would be a moral victory at best and 
would do nothing to solve the enforcement problems attributed to third wave 
litigation. See Mills & Mclendon, supra note 11, at 387-409. The appendix of 
the authors’ article indicates that even states with very strong language in their 
constitutions are not assured a plaintiff victory. See Mills & Mclendon, supra 
note 11, at 387-409. For example, despite the fact that the Georgia 
Constitution states that education “shall be a primary obligation” of the state, 
plaintiffs lost when they challenged the state’s funding scheme as inadequate 
and in violation of equal protection. See McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 
421 (Ga. 1981). 
75 Compare Abbott, 575 A.2d 359, with Pawtucket, 662 A.2d 40. 
76 See, e.g., CFE I, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995). 
77 Id. 
  78 N.Y. CONST. (1777). The Charter of Liberties and Privileges, adopted 
in 1683 and re-enacted by the charter of 1691 predates the Constitution of 
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education. The current Education Article first appeared in the 
Constitution of 1894 and has remained unchanged.79 However, 
many legislative decisions on education were made between 1777 
and 189480 that allowed New York to develop a world-renowned 
education system.81 New York’s rich history, recognizing the 
importance of education as a means for the state’s intellectual and 
material prosperity for all classes of people, is eloquently 
                                                          
1777. It remained the Constitution for the Colony until the American 
Revolution in 1776 and also did not mention education. See CHARTER OF 
LIBERTIES AND PRIVILEGES 1683, available at http://www.montauk.com/ 
history/seeds/charter.-htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2000). 
  79 N.Y. CONST. art. IX (1894) (“The legislature shall provide for the 
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the 
children of this state may be educated.”). 
80 See generally THE STATE EDUC. DEP’T, EDUC. AND THE 1967 
CONVENTION: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED PROPOSALS AFFECTING EDUCATION 
WHICH MAY COME BEFORE THE CONVENTION 19 (1966). This book cites ten 
legislative decisions: (1) establishment of the Regents (1784); (2) provisions 
for public elementary schools (1812); (3) division of the state into local school 
districts and local property tax support for public elementary schools (1812); 
(4) creation of a separate state department to administer the public elementary 
school (1812-1854); (5) discontinuance of state support for denominational 
schools in New York City (1842); (6) state provisions for the professional 
education and certification of elementary school teachers (1834-1844); (7) 
state tax support for schools and a beginning toward state equalization of 
educational opportunities (1851); (8) provisions for public and secondary 
schools (1853); (9) provisions for state scholarships for higher education 
(1865); and (10) free school principle adopted (1867). Id. 
  81 See State of New York, In Convention Document No. 62: Report of the 
Committee on Education and the Funds Pertaining Thereto, 2 Documents / 
Constitutional Convention (1894) (presented by Frederick W. Holls, 
Chairman) [hereinafter Document No. 62]: 
In the regard of other states and countries it is this university which 
has given New York her reputation and her position in the literature 
of education. At the world’s fair in Paris, in 1889, the Grand Prix, 
the highest award was given to the Regents of the University in 
recognition of the fact, which is well known to students of French 
educational history, that Napoleon modeled the National University of 
France upon the University of the State of New York. 
Id. at 5. 
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recorded in the Report of the Committee on Education82 for New 
York State’s 1894 Constitutional Convention.83 The Committee 
successfully argued that New York should have a provision for 
education in its constitution.84 The provision states, in pertinent 
part, “[t]he legislature shall provide for the maintenance and 
support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the 
children of this State may be educated.”85 
The notion of equal educational opportunity pervades the 
Education Committee’s Report. The Committee, in arguing that 
New York State should fund education stated the following: 
In some way we have lost sight of the laws made in the 
early days of New York, and the views held by the great 
men who first gave shape to its policy. They made a law 
which they meant should reach all classes, and to give a 
chance for all to gain knowledge. . . . [Education] will 
always get great aid from [private sources], but if it 
depends upon that alone only a class can enjoy it.86 
                                                          
  82 Id. 
  83 The education provision proposed by the Committee (“[t]he legislature 
shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common 
schools, wherein all the children of this State may be educated”) was adopted 
by the Convention of 1894 and has since remained unchanged. Id. at 1. 
84 New York’s current education provision dates back to 1894. See N.Y. 
CONST. art. XI § 1. 
  85 Document No. 62, supra note 81, at 1. 
  86  Document No. 62, supra note 81, at 7. Throughout the document there 
are references to the state’s intention that an adequate education should be 
provided to all children in the State of New York. The Committee writes: 
“[T]he people well know, or instinctively feel that it is the highest wisdom to 
make their own schools so good that the rich will attend them, and to put 
schooling before the poor in the light of a duty rather than a privilege.” 
Document No. 62, supra note 81, at 8. They also write: 
Prof. Huxley’s definition of a system of education worthy of the 
name has become classical, as requiring an educational ladder with its 
foot in the gutter and its top in the university, every single step and 
rung complete and within the reach of every climber. The vision of 
just this system was, in no doubt, in the minds of the founders of the 
University of the State of New York, and it is for this Convention to 
determine how far that vision shall now be realized. 
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New York State continues to value education. Today, not only 
does the media report extensively on education issues, but the 
candidates for the 2000 New York Senate Race based major parts 
of their campaigns on education.87 
Concerned New Yorkers have channeled their energy into 
New York State courtrooms where, in the past twenty years, 
three major lawsuits have been filed in an attempt to overturn 
New York’s education funding scheme.88 Finance litigation 
precedent in New York was created in 1982 when the New York 
Court of Appeals “modified” the lower court’s decision in 
Levittown v. Nyquist.89 The lower court found that the state’s 
public school financing system violated New York’s Equal 
Protection Clause and Education Article of its constitution.90 The 
Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the existing state funding 
scheme to finance public education did not violate the equal 
protection clauses of the federal or state constitutions, nor did it 
violate the Education Article of the New York Constitution.91 
However, the court left the door open for future third wave 
litigation by holding that the New York Constitution requires the 
state to provide enough funding so that every child receives a 
                                                          
Document No. 62, supra note 81, at 10. 
 87 See, e.g., Karen W. Arenson, Vision of CUNY as a Contender in 
Select Fields, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2000, at B1; Jim Dwyer, A Financial 
School Daze, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 12, 1997, at 3; Anemona Hartocolis, 
Brooklyn School Breaks from the Pack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2000, at B1; 
Owen Moritz, African-Americans Gain in School, Lag in Income, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, July 30, 1998, at 28; Jacques Steinberg, Answers to an English 
Question, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, at 37. 
  88 CFE I, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995); REFIT v. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d 
647 (N.Y. 1995); Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982). Ceaser 
v. Pataki, No. 98 Civ. 8532, 2000 WL 1154318 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000), 
is a recent federal class action lawsuit also attempting to overturn New York’s 
funding scheme claiming Title VI violations. 
89 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982). 
  90 N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (stating that “[t]he legislature shall provide 
for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein 
all the children of this state may be educated”). 
  91 Levittown, 439 N.E.2d at 370. 
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“sound basic education.” 92 
Not discouraged, plaintiffs in Reform Educational Financing 
Inequities Today (“REFIT”) v. Cuomo93 brought a lawsuit 
challenging New York State’s school funding, claiming that 
funding disparities between rich and poor school districts violated 
New York’s education provision.94 Although they attempted to 
revive the third wave adequacy claim left open in Levittown, 
plaintiffs erred by only proffering second wave evidence of 
inequities.95 Plaintiffs alleged that the system of education 
financing in New York had resulted in such a “gross and glaring 
inadequacy” as to warrant intervention by the courts.96 However, 
because plaintiffs tried to prove their claim by showing the 
“dramatic widening in tax-base gap between rich and poor 
districts,” that is the inequities, the challenge failed.97 The 
Second Circuit stated that plaintiffs failed to allege that students 
were not provided with a sound, basic education required by the 
court in Levittown.98 
Attempts to overturn New York’s education finance scheme 
have failed because of misguided pleadings. In Levittown, 
plaintiffs failed to claim that children did not receive a “sound 
basic education,” in other words, to allege “that the educational 
facilities or services provided in the school districts fall below the 
                                                          
  92 Id. at 369. 
  93 655 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1995). 
  94 Id. 
95 Id. 
  96 REFIT, 655 N.E.2d at 648 (emphasis added). 
  97 REFIT, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 655 N.E.2d 647 
(N.Y. 1995): 
We find that the Supreme Court properly found in favor of the 
defendants, since the plaintiffs do not allege that their students are not 
being provided with a sound, basic education. Since plaintiffs in this 
case merely assert that there are disparities in the financing of rich 
and poor school districts, and the Court of Appeals has already 
determined in the Levittown case that such disparities are not 
unconstitutional, we find that the complaint was properly dismissed. 
Id. at 46. 
  98 439 N.E.2d 359. 
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statewide minimum standard of educational quality and 
quantity.”99 Instead, plaintiffs erroneously argued that the 
“system results in grossly disparate financial support.”100 As a 
result, the court refused to follow Serrano v. Priest,101 and to 
equalize funding, reasoning that such a holding would inevitably 
result in diminished quality of education.102 Similarly, in REFIT, 
the New York Court of Appeals recognized that disparities in 
funding between rich and poor districts exist, but refused to 
equally distribute education funding between them.103 Because 
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that students were receiving 
education below minimum standards, the court could not rule 
appropriately on the adequacy theory.104 
B.  Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State: A Procedural 
History 
For the third time in twenty years, plaintiffs brought a lawsuit 
to overturn New York’s education funding system.105 In May of 
1993, CFE, a coalition of parents, students, educators and 
organizations brought a lawsuit against the State of New York 
claiming that the state’s funding scheme violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution,106 the Equal 
Protection Clause107 and Education Article of the New York State 
Constitution,108 and the Title VI regulations.109 At trial, the court 
                                                          
  99 Id. at 363. 
  100 Id. at 361-62. 
  101 Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977). 
  102 See supra notes 49, 61 and accompanying text (discussing why equity 
claims are usually unsuccessful). 
103 REFIT, 655 N.E.2d at 648. 
  104 REFIT, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (App. Div. 1993). 
105 See Levittown, 439 N.E.2d 359; REFIT, 655 N.E.2d 647; CFE I, 655 
N.E.2d 661. 
  106 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (stating that “[n]o state shall . . . deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). 
  107 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11 (stating that “[n]o person shall be denied the 
equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof”). 
  108 N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (stating that “[t]he legislature shall provide 
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granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the first 
and second wave equity claims based on the federal and state 
constitutions, but denied their motion with respect to the third 
wave adequacy claim and the fourth wave Title VI regulations 
claim.110 On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the 
lower court’s decision.111 The court held that CFE properly 
alleged that the defendants’ method of financing schools violated 
both the Education Article of New York’s Constitution and the 
Title VI regulations, and it remanded the case to the Supreme 
Court for adjudication on those claims.112 
Beginning October 12, 1999, the parties presented their 
arguments to Judge Leland DeGrasse in New York County 
Supreme Court.113 The court held that the defendants violated 
both New York’s Education Article and the Title VI 
regulations.114 Judge DeGrasse stated: 
The education provided [to] New York City students is so 
deficient that it falls below the constitutional floor set by 
the Education Article of the New York State 
Constitution. . . . With respect to plaintiffs’ claim under 
Title VI’s implementing regulations, the court finds that 
the State school funding system has an adverse and 
disparate impact on minority public school children and 
that this disparate impact is not adequately justified by any 
reason related to education.115 
                                                          
for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein 
all the children of this state may be educated”). 
  109 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2000) (prohibiting any recipient of federal 
funding from “utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration which have the 
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, 
or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing 
accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a 
particular race, color, or national origin”). 
  110 CFE v. State, 162 Misc. 2d 493, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). 
111 CFE I, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995). 
  112 Id. 
  113 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001). 
114 Id. 
  115 Id. at 478. The trial lasted seven months, seventy-two witnesses took 
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1.  The Third Wave Education Article Claim 
CFE rectified the inadequate pleadings that plagued previous 
attempts to reform New York’s education system by consciously 
adopting third wave language consistent with Levittown’s 
holding. “Plaintiffs here, unlike the Levittown plaintiffs,” Judge 
DeGrasse noted, “specifically allege that the education provided 
to thousands of New York City public school students falls below 
minimum statewide standards and therefore deprives them of a 
‘sound basic education.’”116 The plaintiffs’ meticulous attention to 
the specific shortfalls in the pleadings of Levittown117 and 
REFIT118 forced the court to “determine precisely what level of 
education is required by the Education Article and whether 
defendants’ financing scheme denies any schoolchildren that level 
of education.”119 
In determining whether the defendants violated the Education 
Article, the court undertook a three part inquiry. First, the court 
defined a sound basic education as the “constitutional floor set by 
the Education Article” under which the quality of education may 
not fall.120 According to the court, a sound basic education 
consists of “the foundational skills that students need to become 
productive citizens capable of civic engagement and sustaining 
competitive employment.”121 Second, the court found that New 
York City’s school children are not provided with the opportunity 
to obtain a sound basic education in the city’s public schools.122 
                                                          
the stand, and over 4,300 documents were admitted into evidence. Id. at 480. 
  116 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss at 3, CFE I, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995) (No. 93-111070) 
[hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law]. 
  117 439 N.E.2d at 363. Plaintiffs failed to claim that “educational facilities 
or services provided in the school districts that they represent fall below . . . 
minimum standard of educational quality and quantity.” Id. 
  118 655 N.E.2d at 648. Plaintiffs failed to claim that “students in their 
district are receiving something less than a sound basic education.” Id. 
  119 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 116, at 11. 
  120 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 478. 
  121 Id. at 487. 
  122 Id. at 549. 
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In so finding, the court examined the “‘inputs,’ the resources 
available to students in public schools,”123 and the “‘outputs,’ the 
measures of student achievement, primarily test results and 
graduation rates.”124 The court concluded that the “majority of 
the City’s public school students leave high school unprepared 
for more than low-paying work, unprepared for college, and 
unprepared for the duties placed upon them by a democratic 
society.”125 
Finally, in the most difficult part of its decision, the court 
decided that there is a “causal link” between the state’s funding 
scheme and the meager opportunity for education in New York 
City.126 In asserting that there is a causal link between education 
funding and an opportunity for a sound basic education, the court 
held that “increased educational resources, if properly deployed, 
can have a significant and lasting effect on student 
performance.”127 In addition, the court found that “the City’s 
ability to contribute to education is hampered by its diversified 
tax base, its higher costs for other municipal services, and by its 
debt burden.”128 The court, however, determined that “it is the 
legislature’s duty” to remove those barriers to educational 
opportunity.129 
                                                          
  123 The “inputs” examined by the court in its 2001 CFE decision are 
teachers, school facilities, curricula, class size, and instrumentalities of 
teaching such as textbooks, library books, and instructional technology. See 
2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 491-515. The court found that New York City’s 
students are provided with “inadequate resources” leaving students 
“unprepared for more than low-paying work, unprepared for college, and 
unprepared for duties placed upon them by a democratic society.” Id. at 520. 
  124 Id. at 515-20. The court found that the “graduation/dropout rates and 
performance on standardized tests demonstrate that students are not receiving a 
minimally adequate education.” Id. at 520. 
  125 Id. at 520. 
  126 Id. at 478, 520-40. 
  127 Id. at 525. 
  128 Id. at 540. 
  129 Id. 
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2.  The Fourth Wave Title VI Regulations Claim 
The plaintiffs also succeeded on their second claim, that the 
state’s school funding scheme disparately impacts minority 
students in violation of the Title VI regulations.130 Title VI 
provides that “[n]o person in the United States, shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal 
financial assistance.”131 Although a showing of intentional 
discrimination is necessary under Title VI,132 the Supreme Court 
has held that the Title VI implementing regulations are valid and 
that disparate impact claims may be brought under them.133 The 
implementing regulation provides that recipients of federal funds 
may not do the following: “Utilize criteria or methods of 
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to 
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or 
have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing 
accomplishment of the objectives of the program.”134 
A validly stated cause of action under Title VI regulations has 
two components. First, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing a 
prima facie case “that a facially neutral practice has had an 
adverse and disparate impact upon a protected class of people.”135 
                                                          
  130 Id. at 478. The court decided 2001 CFE before the Supreme Court 
decided Alexander v. Sandoval, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001). In Alexander, the 
Court held, 5-4, that no private right of action exists under Title VI 
regulations standing alone. Id. However, since then, two district courts have 
held that claims under Title VI regulations can be maintained under § 1983. 
See Lucero v. Detroit Pub. Sch., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, available at 2001 WL 
1013368 (E.D. Mich. 2001); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J Dep’t. of 
Envtl. Protection, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001). 
  131 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
  132 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292 (1985); Guardians Ass’n 
v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 583, 610 (1983); Regents of Univ. of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978); African American Legal 
Defense Fund v. State, 8 F. Supp. 2d 204, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
  133 See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 292; Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584. 
  134 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2000). 
  135 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 541 (citing New York City Envtl. Justice 
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If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then 
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a “substantial legitimate 
justification” for the practice.136 If the defendant meets this 
burden, the plaintiff can still prevail by showing either that “the 
defendant overlooked an equally effective alternative with less 
discriminatory effects or that the proffered justification is no 
more than a pretext for racial discrimination.”137 
In 2001 CFE, the court held that the evidence demonstrated 
“the existence of a disparate adverse impact on minority students 
caused by the State’s funding system.”138 The court measured the 
disparate impact by comparing funding to enrollment figures.139 
In doing so, the court found the following: 
[Seventy-three percent] of the State’s minority public 
school students are enrolled in New York City’s public 
schools, minority students make up approximately 84% of 
New York City’s public school enrollment, and New 
York City receives less funding per capita, on average 
than districts in the rest of the state.140 
Furthermore, the court held as insufficient the four justifications 
defendants articulated for the disparate impact.141 The court was 
                                                          
Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 69 (2d. Cir. 2000)); see also Georgia State 
Conference of Branches of NAACP v. State, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 
1985); Groves v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1523 (M.D. 
Ala. 1991). 
  136 Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982-83 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). 
  137 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 541 (citing Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 
387, 394 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
  138 Id. at 546. 
  139 Id. at 542. 
  140 Id. In comparing the funding per capita, the court found that New 
York City consistently received less total state aid than its percentage share of 
enrolled students. Id. Between the school years of 1994-95 and 1999-2000, 
New York had approximately 37% of the state’s enrolled students and 
received a percentage of total state aid ranging from 33.98% to 35.65%. Id. at 
543. 
  141 Id. at 547. 
First, defendants argue that school funding formulas are 
wealth-equalizing and New York City is a relatively more affluent 
school district. Second, they argue that directing funding according to 
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particularly critical of the state’s argument that directing funding 
according to districts’ average attendance rates, as opposed to 
enrollment rates, is “related to the State’s legitimate objectives of 
encouraging districts to keep attendance up and discouraging 
their inflation of enrollment figures.”142 The court held that “[t]he 
state’s choice to base school funding on districts’ average 
attendance is unnecessarily punitive. It creates a perverse 
direction of state aid by directing aid away from districts with 
large numbers of at risk students.”143 Therefore, plaintiffs 
established a violation of Title VI regulations. 
3. The Remedy 
Unlike remedies from second and third wave cases, 2001 
CFE evades the remedy problems of past litigation strategies, that 
is the problems of equalizing funding and judicial activism, by 
placing the ultimate burden of creating a remedy on the state 
legislature.144 The New York State Legislature is more likely to 
develop an appropriate funding scheme given the nature of the 
federal spending power; if the state legislature fails to comply 
with the Title VI regulations, the state’s federal funding will be 
revoked.145 This is a substantial motivating factor absent from 
second and third wave claims.146 
                                                          
districts’ average attendance, rather than to enrollment, is related to 
the State’s legitimate objectives of encouraging districts to keep 
attendance up and discouraging their inflation of enrollment 
figures. . . . Third, defendants argue that distributing transportation 
and building aid on a reimbursement basis, which has historically 
harmed the City, is justified. Fourth, defendants argue that their 
formulas take student need into account. 
Id. 
  142 Id. 
  143 Id. at 549. 
  144 Id. at 540 (stating that it is the “legislature’s duty . . . to reform how 
education is financed in New York State”). 
  145 See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); 
see also infra Part III (discussing the remedy for violations of Title VI and its 
regulations, including revocation of federal funds). 
  146 Enforcing old wave claims entails more litigation. The most notorious 
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In holding that defendants violated both the Education Article 
and the Title VI regulations, the court ordered a remedy 
requiring the state legislature to revamp the state’s funding 
scheme.147 The court purposely delegated the creation of the 
remedy to the state legislature and gave three reasons for doing 
so: 
First, the Court of Appeals held . . . that the State 
Constitution “imposes a duty on the Legislature to ensure 
the availability of a sound basic education to all of the 
children of the State.” Second, this action has focused 
principally on how the current system affects New York 
City, but any remedy will necessarily involve the entire 
State. The legislature is in a better position to gauge the 
effects of reform on the State as a whole. Third, the 
legislature is better positioned to work with the Governor 
and other governmental actors who have a role in 
reforming the current educational system. In particular, 
the Regents, SED (State Education Department) and BOE 
(Board of Education) have far greater expertise than this 
court in crafting solutions to the educational problems 
discussed in this opinion. This expertise should guide the 
State as it reforms the current system. There is no need, 
at least at this time, for the court to supersede the 
legislature, the Governor, the State Education 
Department, and the Regents, in imposing a remedy.148 
In its lengthy opinion, the court provided the legislature with 
                                                          
example is the ongoing litigation in New Jersey where the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has twice rejected legislative reforms as insufficient to address 
the inadequacies of the education system. See Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 
(N.J. 1994); Abbott v. Burke, 639 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997); see also Sheff v. 
O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (holding that Connecticut’s legislature 
failed to provide plaintiffs with a substantially equal education opportunity); 
State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001) (rejecting a 
legislature’s attempt to remedy unconstitutional school funding). 
  147 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (ordering that “the defendants shall 
put in place reforms of school financing and governance designed to redress 
the constitutional and regulatory violations set forth in this opinion”). 
  148 Id. at 549-50 (quoting CFE I, 655 N.E.2d at 665). 
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guidelines to create an appropriate remedy and required 
implementation of the remedy by September 15, 2001.149 
Shortly after the court delivered its opinion, George Pataki, 
the Governor of the New York, announced that he would appeal 
2001 CFE.150 Notwithstanding the court’s deliberate deference to 
the legislature, Pataki gave the following reason for his decision: 
“You can’t have a judge running an entire educational system.”151 
Ignoring the decision’s language, he stated that he “will challenge 
the decision because we want to make sure that the responsibility 
[to revamp the state’s education financing scheme] rests with the 
elected officials.”152 Governor Pataki’s concerns are misplaced. 
The court was conscious of its role as interpreter of the law and, 
as such, declared the state’s actions unconstitutional and in 
violation of federal regulations.153 The court left the role of 
creating education legislation to the state legislature, stating that 
“it is the legislature that must . . . take steps to reform the 
current system.”154 
II.  OLD WAVE ENFORCEMENT OF EDUCATION FINANCE 
REMEDIES 
The work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in 
another sense ephemeral. What is good in it endures. 
What is erroneous is pretty sure to perish. The good 
remains the foundation on which new structures will be 
built. The bad will be rejected and cast off in the 
laboratory of the years.155 
                                                          
  149 Id. at 550-51. The legislature has not yet crafted a remedy because the 
state has appealed the decision. Id., appeal docketed, No. 111070/93 (N.Y. 
App. Div. Aug. 13, 2001). 
  150 See Richard Pérez-Peña, Pataki to Appeal Decision by Judge on Aid to 
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001, at Al. 
  151 Id. 
  152 Id. 
  153 See 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 478. 
  154 Id. at 549-50. 
  155 CARDOZO, supra note 35, at 178. 
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The second and third waves of litigation have been 
unsuccessful or unpredictable at best.156 The second wave has 
been unsuccessful because it requires courts to remedy violations 
of the state and federal claims by forcing legislatures to distribute 
funding equally to school districts.157 Similarly, the third wave 
has not always been effective because it too requires a certain 
amount of judicial activism to oversee the enforcement of 
remedies.158 In some cases, the subsequent litigation enforcing 
remedies has taken years.159 For this reason, some courts have 
criticized the courts that rule favorably on third wave claims 
opining that they have inappropriately entered the political 
thickets.160 
A.  The Equity Wave: Equality Means Mediocrity for All 
Equal protection analysis begins with the identification of the 
appropriate standard of review.161 Strict scrutiny, triggered by the 
infringement of a fundamental right, does not apply in federal 
cases in which the right claimed is education.162 Education is not 
a fundamental right protected explicitly or implicitly by the 
United States Constitution.163 Moreover, although it is generally 
recognized that state constitutions may afford greater protection 
than found under the equivalent provision in the United States 
                                                          
156 See infra Part II.A-B (discussing the shortfalls of both the equity and 
adequacy waves). 
  157 See infra Part II.A (discussing the shortfalls of the equity wave). 
  158 See infra Part II.B (discussing the shortfalls of the adequacy wave). 
159 See supra note 146 (discussing the numerous cases and years of 
litigation required to enforce the Abbott, 575 A.2d 359, decision). 
  160 See City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995). 
  161 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 
(1973) (stating that the Court “must decide, first, whether the Texas system of 
financing public education . . . impinges upon the fundamental right explicitly 
or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial 
scrutiny”). 
162 Id. 
  163 Id. 
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Constitution,164 the New York Court of Appeals has explicitly 
provided that its Equal Protection Clause “is no broader in 
coverage than the Federal Provision.”165 
Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals in CFE I 
dismissed both the federal and state equal protection claims 
despite the plaintiffs’ compelling arguments that intermediate 
scrutiny should be applied. Plaintiffs distinguished their case 
from early education finance challenges by arguing that 
thousands of New York City children are deprived of an adequate 
education unlike the arguments made by plaintiffs in Rodriguez 
and Levittown.166 Here, plaintiffs argued that this case is similar 
to Plyler v. Doe, where the plaintiffs alleged that thousands of 
alien children were being deprived of an education.167 In Plyler, 
the Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny, and held that 
the state must further a substantial goal when denying a basic 
education to undocumented alien children.168 Plaintiffs further 
argued that because Plyler was decided eight days before the 
court issued its decision in Levittown, the New York Court of 
Appeals did not consider the full implications of the decision.169 
                                                          
  164 See Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 
42 Record, N.Y.C.B.A. 285, 299 (1987) (“In [New York], in fact, there is a 
long tradition of reading the parallel clauses independently and affording 
broader protection, where appropriate, under the State Constitution.”); see 
also Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 255 (N.D. 1994). 
  165 Under 21 v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 1, 8 n.6 (N.Y. 1985). 
  166 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 116, at 12-14 (“Plaintiffs’ 
allegation here that students are receiving an education below minimum 
standards thus dramatically shifts the legal landscape, not only in regard to 
claims under the New York State Constitution’s Education Article, but also 
under the state and federal equal protection clauses.”). 
  167 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 206 (1982). The Court held that 
defendants’ denial of a free public education to plaintiffs was not justified by a 
showing that the denial furthered a substantial state interest. Id. at 230. 
  168 Id. at 224. 
  169 Plaintiff s Memorandum of Law, supra note 116, at 17 n.9. An 
argument, not offered by plaintiffs in 2001 CFE, but may have convinced the 
court that education is a fundamental right in New York, is based purely on 
the history of education in New York and the intent of the framers of the 
Education Article. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text (describing 
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Arguably, the New York Court of Appeals also decided to 
dismiss both the federal and state equal protection claims because 
the equal protection remedies in education finance cases have 
invariably led to court mandates requiring equal funding among 
wealthy and poor school districts.170 In states where courts have 
granted the equal protection remedies, the wealthy school 
districts suffered huge budget cuts without much increase in 
funding to the poorer school districts because the number of poor 
school districts far exceeded the number of wealthy school 
districts. In Levittown, the New York Court of Appeals exhibited 
trepidation in requiring equal distribution of funding when it 
stated that “[a]ny legislative attempt to make uniform and 
undeviating the educational opportunities offered by the several 
hundred local school districts . . . would inevitably work the 
demise of the local control of education available to students in 
individual districts.”171 
As a result of the problems encountered in implementing 
equity remedies, the courts have practically urged parties to plead 
third wave adequacy claims. For example, when Virginia 
plaintiffs brought second wave equality claims based on the 
state’s Equal Protection Clause, the Virginia Circuit Court in 
Scott v. Commonwealth172 refused to equate “high quality” with 
                                                          
the importance of education in New York as evidenced by historical 
documents). For example, in Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997), the 
Vermont Supreme Court held that its system of financing education deprived 
children of an equal educational opportunity in violation of its constitution. 
Despite the fact that the state’s Education Act lacks strong language like New 
York’s, the court found a fundamental right on the basis of the history of 
education in democratic civilizations, the United States, and Vermont. Id. at 
393 (“[T]he greatest legislators from Lycurgus down to John Locke, have laid 
down a moral and scientific system of education as the very foundation and 
cement of a State.”). The court held that “in Vermont the right to education is 
so integral to our constitutional form of government, and its guarantees of 
political and civil rights, that any statutory framework that infringes upon the 
equal enjoyment of that right bears a commensurate heavy burden of 
justification.” Id. 
  170 See supra notes 46-61 (discussing the shortfalls of equity claims). 
  171 Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 367 (N.Y. 1982). 
  172 29 Va. Cir. 324, 1992 WL 886029 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 443 
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“equality.”173 The court stated that “[t]he Virginia Constitution, 
while establishing education as a fundamental right, does not as 
written make equalized funding on the part of the Commonwealth 
a constitutional right.”174 As if to ask future plaintiffs to make 
third wave claims, the court compared the plaintiffs’ equity claim 
to the adequacy claim in Rose v. Council for Better Education.175 
The Virginia Circuit Court stated that “[t]he Rose plaintiffs 
alleged that Kentucky public school students were receiving an 
inadequate education, one that did not even meet minimal 
standards.”176 Because the plaintiffs in Scott did not allege a third 
wave adequacy claim, the court dismissed the case.177 
Few courts strike down education funding schemes on the 
basis of equity claims, making it clear that courts are aware of 
the dangers that a state faces when it tries to provide equal 
funding to all school districts.178 Hence, in the post-Serrano era, 
courts that find funding systems in violation of their states’ equal 
protection clauses are reluctant to issue remedies.179 For this 
reason, advocates have ultimately come to rely on third wave 
adequacy arguments to overturn funding schemes.180 However, 
this reliance should be met with caution as more courts refuse 
even third wave adequacy arguments on the grounds that the 
remedies associated with them require excessive judicial 
oversight.181 
                                                          
S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994). 
  173 Id. at *4. 
  174 Id. at *5. 
  175 790 S.W.2d 186, 207-08 (Ky. 1989) (holding that the Kentucky 
Constitution requires substantial uniformity and equality). 
176 Scott, 1992 WL 885029, at *5. 
  177 Id. at *6. 
178 This is a result of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
(holding that education is not a fundamental right protected by the Federal 
Constitution). 
179 See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the dissatisfaction that scholars felt in 
the aftermath of equity cases such as Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 
1971)). 
180 See generally Heise, supra note 37. 
181 See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995). 
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B.  The Adequacy Wave and Judicial Activism 
Opposition to judicial activism in the realm of education 
started most notably after the Warren Court decided Brown v. 
Board of Education in 1954.182 The Warren Court affected a 
change in the power relationships between branches of the 
government, resulting in “a massive transfer of power from 
elected officials . . . to [the judiciary].”183 The Court’s decision 
to exercise its remedial power to supervise and maintain detailed 
control over various school desegregation plans caused some 
backlash on the part of conservative scholars.184 Hostility towards 
the Court’s expanded power to bring about social reform, 
initiated by the Warren Court in Brown, is a prominent factor in 
the mixed results of adequacy claims. 
Of course, not all courts take such a harsh stance. Many are 
willing to exercise their remedial powers to bring about much 
needed reform in inadequate school systems.185 However, even 
the most progressive courts have expressed some trepidation in 
                                                          
  182 See JOHN DENTON CARTER, THE WARREN COURT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL VIEW OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 7 (1973). Referring 
to the Brown decision, the author states: 
It was in the school desegregation decree that the Warren Court took 
the plunge directly into the political and legislative thickets to bring 
about what it considered to be desirable social and political reforms 
and thereby introduced into the judicial process a sense of abandon 
that the New Deal Court had only approached. 
Id. 
  183 Id. at 8. 
  184 See id. at 6. The author states: 
From all of the warped decisions of the Warren Court, serious 
consequences have followed. Some of the results have been: . . . a 
breakdown in law and order . . . federal court supervision of the 
public schools in the most minute details . . . the flooding of the 
country with pornography; the downgrading of religious training of 
children in the public schools. 
Id. at 10. The author goes on to link the remedial action of the Warren Court 
in Brown to “death of the great cities” and eventually “[c]haos.” Id. at 11. 
185 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 207-08 
(Ky. 1989). 
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issuing broad remedies that define guidelines for legislative 
action.186 For example, in Rose v. Council for Better Education, 
the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the state’s education 
system was inadequate under the state education provision, but 
stayed its extensive remedial order allowing time for its 
legislature to act on its own.187 The concept of giving deference 
to the state legislature to formulate its own remedy before court 
action permeates many of the recent education funding cases, 
including 2001 CFE.188 
To rely on the success of an adequacy claim is to rely on a 
court’s view that it has the remedial power to bring about social 
change, a recognized court function that still meets opposition in 
a fair number of our nation’s courts.189 Although most scholars 
agree that “[f]ew people in contemporary society see the effect of 
Brown itself as anything other than a great triumph for justice,”190 
they also agree that courts exercising their remedial power, like 
the Warren Court in Brown, have “more often followed the 
policies that are generally supported by liberals and opposed by 
conservatives.”191 Therefore, even with a clear showing of 
inadequacy, court implemented remedies are not always certain 
to follow. 
The old waves of equity and adequacy are ineffective or 
unreliable at best because courts fear implementing the associated 
                                                          
  186 See, e.g., Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 59. “The volume of litigation and 
the extent of judicial oversight provide a chilling example of the thickets that 
can entrap a court that takes on the duty of the Legislature.” Id. 
  187 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 186; see also Paynter v. State, 220 N.Y.S.2d 
712, 720 (2000) (encouraging the parties to “consider committing their 
resources to the fashioning and application of remedies, and not to further 
litigation and a court mandated solution”). 
  188 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the respective roles of state 
legislatures and courts in 2001 CFE); see also Paynter, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 720. 
However, after encouraging the parties to develop their own remedy, the court 
stated that “should this court find that the State has discriminated against the 
[plaintiffs], the State will be held accountable and a remedy ordered.” Id. 
  189 CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM 
OR PRECARIOUS SECURITY? 24 (rev. ed., Rowman & Littlefield 1997) (1991). 
  190 Id. 
  191 Id. at 25. 
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remedies.192 Equity remedies require states to distribute funding 
equally among school districts and, in the aftermath of cases like 
Serrano, are rarely implemented.193 In addition, because 
adequacy remedies seek to implement an adequate education, and 
because state definitions of an adequate education are 
multi-faceted and comprehensive, remedies are difficult to 
implement and enforce.194 Therefore, courts, in ruling for 
plaintiffs on adequacy grounds, must often be prepared to 
oversee the implementation and enforcement of the remedy for 
years, which, in many cases, they are unwilling to do.195 
III. TITLE VI AND ENFORCING FINANCE REMEDIES 
We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as 
old as the Scriptures. . . . [T]he question is whether we 
are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be 
treated.196 
 
It has been nearly thirty years since the first education finance 
cases were litigated. For the first time, it seems, advocates have 
found the proper tool to litigate such cases. Because Title VI was 
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, its remedy avoids the 
problems of past litigation strategies, and is therefore our best 
hope for ending discriminatory funding in our nation’s public 
schools. 
The Spending Clause of Article I provides that “Congress 
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and 
                                                          
192 See supra Part I.A.1, II (discussing the shortfalls of second and third 
waves of litigation). 
193 See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the dissatisfaction that scholars felt in 
the aftermath of equity cases such as Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 
1971)). 
  194 See, e.g., Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 59; but see Abbott v. Burke, 575 
A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). 
  195 See, e.g., Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 59; State v. Campbell County Sch. 
Dist., 19 P.3d 518, 526 (Wyo. 2001). 
196 President John F. Kennedy, Television Address Introducing the Civil 
Rights Bill (June 11, 1963). 
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Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence 
and Welfare of the United States.”197 The clause allows Congress 
to spend its money to provide for the general welfare of the 
United States. In other words, Congress, in exchange for federal 
funds, can require recipients to comply with all of the 
requirements of the statute.198 The use of congressional spending 
power has been upheld in numerous situations.199 For example, in 
South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute 
conditioning the states’ receipt of federal highway funds on the 
adoption of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one.200 In the 
decision written by then-Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that 
“[e]ven if Congress might lack the power to impose a national 
                                                          
197 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
  198 See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974). 
  199 See, e.g., id.; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (defining the 
limits of Spending Clause legislation); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 
(1936) (holding for the first time that Congress can enact legislation pursuant 
to the Spending Clause). 
  200 483 U.S. 203 (1987). The court in Dole articulated the scope of the 
spending power. Id. at 207-08. First, the exercise of the spending power must 
be in pursuit of the general welfare of the people. Id. Second, if Congress 
desires to condition the states’ receipt of federal funds, it must do so 
unambiguously. Id. Third, the conditions on federal grants might be 
illegitimate if they are unrelated to federal interests, in particular national 
projects or programs. Id. Fourth, other constitutional provisions may provide 
an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds. Id. Title VI 
satisfies the four criteria outlined by Dole. First, that Title VI is in pursuit of 
the general welfare is undisputable; in fact, the Civil Rights Act has been 
hailed by scholars as the most effective tool in ending insidious racial 
discrimination. 24 U.S.C. § 2000d; see, e.g., Gary Orfield, Conservative 
Activists and the Rush Toward Resegregation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM 
42 (Jay P. Huebert ed., Yale University Press 1999) (1998). The author states: 
“The courts provided clear leadership only after Congress acted in 1964 and 
1965 to transform civil rights law and the Johnson Administration 
employed . . . the threat of cutoff of federal funds.” Id. The language of Title 
VI unambiguously conditions the receipt of federal funds on compliance with 
its provision. See infra note 207 (citing language of the relevant provision) and 
accompanying text (discussing the effect of Spending Clause legislation). Also, 
the federal funds relate to a particular national project, the education of 
America’s children. Lastly, the goal of minimizing racial inequality is far from 
unconstitutional. See Mills & Mclendon, supra note 11, at 334-35. 
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drinking age directly, we conclude that the encouragement to 
state action . . . is valid use of the spending power.”201 
The need for Title VI legislation, enacted pursuant to the 
Spending Clause in order to end discriminatory state action, 
surfaced most notably in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of 
Education.202 In the ten years between Brown and the enactment 
of Title VI, “the Deep South remained almost entirely 
segregated.”203 Because court ordered remedies to end 
segregation were met with great opposition, Congress enacted 
Title VI to facilitate integration: “The 1964 Act’s manifestation 
of federal determination, at both the legislative and executive 
levels, to end unlawful segregation played a major role in making 
Brown a reality.”204 
Title VI conditions the receipt of federal funds on a state’s 
compliance with its guidelines.205 The statute provides that “[n]o 
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
                                                          
  201 Dole, 483 U.S. at 212. It should be noted that many scholars are wary 
of the congressional spending power, fearing that the legislation enacted 
pursuant to the Spending Clause could be overly coercive. See Lynn A. Baker, 
Conditional Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1914-16 (1995) 
(arguing that the four part Dole test is unworkable as it allows Congress to 
infringe on state sovereignty in violation of the principles of federalism); 
Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 1103 (1987) (arguing that conditions infringing on individual 
rights should be struck down as unconstitutional). All are in agreement, 
however, that Title VI is validly enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause. See, 
e.g., Brett D. Proctor, Note, Using the Spending Power to Circumvent City of 
Boerne v. Flores: Why the Court Should Require Constitutional Consistency in 
Its Unconstitutional Conditions Analysis, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 490 (2000). 
“The validity of Title VI as Spending Clause legislation is beyond question.” 
Id. (citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974)). 
  202 BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS 5l (1997). 
  203 Id. 
  204 Id.; see also STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 537 (3d ed. 1996). 
The authors state that Title VI is “important not only because the threatened 
fund cutoff provided an impetus for desegregation, but also because the 
guidelines provided the courts with an escape from the morass of case-by-case 
litigation over individual desegregation plans.” Id. 
205 See 28 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
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benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program 
or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”206 The statute 
was conceived of by President Kennedy who, during his 
administration, requested that “Congress grant executive 
departments and agencies authority to cut off federal programs 
that discriminate against Negroes.”207 Title VI rests on the 
principle that “taxpayers’ money, which is collected without 
discrimination, shall be spent without discrimination.”208 In other 
words, the legislators intended to reserve federal funds for those 
states willing to end discrimination.209 
Advocates are just realizing now that Title VI is more than a 
tool to end desegregation, but also a tool to end the 
discriminatory distribution of education funding.210 Its 
effectiveness stems from its unique ability to enforce remedies. In 
ruling for plaintiffs on Title VI regulation claims, courts will 
avoid the old wave problems of equalization and judicial activism 
by providing court enforcement of private remedies through the 
revocation of federal funding. Congress’ clear intention was to 
equip courts with such enforcement power: 
We come then to the crux of the dispute—how this right 
[to participate in federally funded programs without 
discrimination] should be protected. And even this issue 
becomes clear upon the most elementary analysis. If 
federal funds are to be dispensed on a nondiscriminatory 
basis, the only possible remedies must fall into one of two 
categories: First, action to end discrimination; or second, 
action to end payment of funds.211 
The plurality in Guardians Association v. Civil Service 
Commission of the City of New York laid out the framework for 
remedies in Title VI disparate impact cases, stating that “where 
                                                          
  206 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
  207 Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 328-29 (1978) (app. to Opinion of Powell, J.). 
  208 110 CONG. REC. 6546, 7064 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff). 
  209 Id. at 1542 (statement of Rep. Lindsay). 
210 See, e.g., 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001). 
  211 110 CONG. REC. 7065 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff), cited in 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 421 n.28 (1978). 
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legal rights have been invaded and a cause of action is available, 
a federal court may use any available remedy to afford full 
relief.”212 The Court specified that the relief “should be limited to 
declaratory and injunctive relief ordering future compliance with 
the declared statutory and regulatory obligations.”213 The Court 
further added that to enforce the remedy, “it is presumed that 
private litigants . . . are entitled to . . . the limited remedy 
deemed available to the plaintiffs in Pennhurst v. Halderman.”214 
In Pennhurst, the Court held that “relief may well be limited to 
enjoining the Federal Government from providing funds to the 
[state].”215 Similarly, in Rosado v. Wyman the Supreme Court 
held that federally funded welfare recipients were entitled to 
“declaratory relief and an appropriate injunction by the District 
Court against the payment of federal monies” to the program 
“should the State not develop a conforming plan within a 
reasonable period of time.”216 
Because Title VI is spending-power legislation, the remedy 
for its violation allows courts to defer to state legislatures to 
enact remedial legislation if it chooses. Not only may the state 
legislature decide not to enact any law at all, but also, if it 
chooses to remedy the violation, it may formulate the law in any 
way that does not have a disparate impact on minorities. The 
Supreme Court of New York recognized this in stating the 
following: 
The legislature must be given the first opportunity to 
reform the current system. . . . That said, the court’s 
deference to the coordinate branches of State government 
is contingent on these branches taking effective and timely 
action to address the problems set forth in this option. The 
                                                          
  212 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983). 
  213 Id. at 598 (1983). 
  214 Id. at 599 (citing Pennhurst v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)). 
  215 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28. 
  216 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970). “New York is, of 
course, in no way prohibited from using only state funds according to 
whatever plan it chooses, providing it violates no provision of the 
Constitution.” Id. 
ERVINGMACRO.DOC 2/25/02  1:27 PM 
 THE QUEST FOR QUALITY EDUCATION 309 
parlous state of the City’s schools demands no less. The 
court will not hesitate to intervene if it finds that the 
legislative and/or executive branches fail to devise and 
implement necessary reform.217 
 If the New York Legislature chooses to comply with 2001 
CFE’s remedy, the court may be asked to intervene once more to 
decide if the proposal disparately impacts minorities. The 
intervention, however, will not require the court to look over the 
shoulders of the New York State Legislature. Rather, the court 
will make a simple calculation, comparing funding distributed to 
minorities and whites in the state, and will intervene if the 
comparison shows that the new funding scheme disparately 
impacts minorities.218 If the proposal does disparately impacts 
minorities, the court may issue an order to revoke the state’s 
federal funding for education altogether.219 If it does not, no 
further intervention is required. 
Although the revocation of federal funding could be drastic, 
having a deleterious effect on the program, there are safeguards 
protecting against such an outcome. The Supreme Court has 
stated that Spending Clause legislation allows states to make a 
choice: either the state “compl[ies] with what a court has 
announced is necessary to conform to federal law,” or the state 
can “withdraw[] from the program.”220 If the state chooses to 
comply, it must “prospectively perform [its] duties incident to the 
receipt of federal money,” or the court may revoke those 
funds.221 
In the case of education funding, however, revocation of 
funds would be antithetical to the goal of providing equal and 
adequate education for all children.222 But if the state refuses to 
                                                          
  217 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 549-50. 
  218 See, e.g., 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 542. 
219 See, e.g., Guardians v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 
596 (1983) (citing Rosado, 397 U.S. at 420-21). 
  220 Id. 
  221 Id. 
  222 110 CONG. REC. 7065 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff), cited in 
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 421 n.28 (1978). 
“Obviously action to end discrimination is preferable since that reaches the 
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comply, it is clear that the courts are left with no other choice 
except to terminate federal funds.223 Fortunately, the political 
process will most likely prevent state noncompliance resulting in 
the withdrawal of federal funds for education.224 It seems beyond 
reason that state legislators would fail to approve a funding 
scheme that is nondiscriminatory, especially if their failure to do 
so would result in drastic funding cuts to education. Such an 
action would infuriate constituents and effectively sound the 
death knell for any legislator seeking to remain in office. 
In sum, a court ruling for plaintiffs on Title VI grounds will 
avoid the problems inherent in equity and adequacy claims, 
namely, reluctance to equalize funding and judicial activism. 
Legislatures will be self-motivated to create funding schemes that 
do not disparately impact minorities because Title VI threatens 
states with the loss of federal funds otherwise. By removing the 
remedy from the courts, the legislative decision of whether and 
how to make funding schemes equitable and adequate will not be 
questioned further by the courts. Upon a court’s finding that a 
state’s funding scheme violates Title VI, the courts will simply 
decide whether the remedy proposed by the legislature has a 
disparate impact on minorities. There is, in effect, a 
mathematical neutrality to the court’s role in enforcing Title VI 
regulations claims.225 
                                                          
objective of extending the funds on a nondiscriminatory basis. But if the 
discrimination persists and cannot be effectively terminated, how else can the 
principle of nondiscrimination be vindicated except by nonpayment of funds?” 
Id. 
  223 Id. 
  224 Cf. Baker, supra note 201, at 1941. “Few congressional 
representatives, after all, should be eager to support legislation that gives the 
states money only if they comply with a condition that a majority of their own 
constituents would independently find unattractive.” Baker, supra note 201, at 
1941. It follows then that state legislatures would comply with legislation that 
a majority of their own constituents find attractive, such as legislation 
providing for nondiscriminatory education fund distribution. 
  225 Two recent federal decisions show that the fourth wave is building 
momentum. In Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Kan. 2000), 
plaintiffs survived defendants’ motion to dismiss after bringing suit in federal 
district court alleging that the state’s funding laws create a discriminatory 
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CONCLUSION 
Old wave claims are relatively unsuccessful because their 
remedies play into courts’ fears of distributing equal funding in 
the wake of Serrano v. Priest226 and judicial activism in the wake 
of Brown v. Board of Education227 and, more recently, Abbott v. 
Burke.228 Both federal and state equity claims have been harshly 
criticized by scholars as inevitably decreasing states’ overall per 
pupil spending, which in turn decreases student achievement. 
Although less so than equity claims, adequacy claims have also 
been criticized because they have been known to require decades 
of further litigation to implement the initial ruling requiring 
adequate funding for all school districts. 
Title VI remedies evade the problems of equity and adequacy 
claims while providing significant legislative discretion in 
formulating a remedy without the need for excessive judicial 
intervention. Because Title VI conditions the receipt of federal 
funds on the non-discriminatory distribution of education 
funding, a court’s role in developing and implementing remedies 
associated with these claims will be greatly diminished. Courts 
should look to see statistically whether minorities are 
discriminated against in state education finance plans and then 
                                                          
disparate impact against the state’s minority students, non-U.S. origin 
students, and disabled students in violation of Title VI. Likewise, in Ceaser v. 
Pataki, No. 98 Civ. 8532, 2000 WL 1154318 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000), a 
lower court held that a complaint alleging that “educational services provided 
by a school system are disproportionately less beneficial to members of one 
race than another” is a validly stated claim under Title VI. Id. at *4. The 
complaint alleged that defendants, including Governor Pataki and the State of 
New York, have adopted a policy of not enforcing New York State education 
law requiring that the state provide school districts with “certified teachers, 
remedial instruction, school facilities and grounds, libraries, and regents 
courses and diplomas.” Id. See also Paynter v. State, 220 N.Y.S.2d 712 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss a Title VI 
regulation claim that state law has an adverse discriminatory impact on 
African-American and Latino students). 
  226 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
  227 347 U.S. 483 (1973). 
  228 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). 
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leave developing and implementing the remedies to the state 
legislatures. Under the circumstances, claims will undoubtedly be 
more successful and more consistent than claims brought under 
the old waves, and could perhaps be the new wave in education 
finance litigation. For these reasons, the plaintiffs in 2001 CFE 
should succeed before the New York Court of Appeals, setting 
solid precedent upon which the fourth wave can be built. 
 
